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1Faculty of Sport, Health and Social Care, University of Gloucestershire, Gloucester, UK, 2Faculty of Culture, and 3Faculty of
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Abstract
In this paper, we explore and reflect critically on what elite sport may expect or fear from genetic technologies. In particular,
we explore the language in which we (where ‘‘we’’ denotes scientists, sports scientists, the media, sports coaches, academics)
tend to speak about genetics, elite sport, and the human body  we call this language ‘‘gene-talk’’  which imagines the
world of elite sport as one in which genes were always dominant in athletic performance. The dominant question here seems
to be whether what is thought to be possible ought to be, and can be realized. We unpack the question by asking whether the
practices needed for genetics to intervene so powerfully in elite sport exist in the straightforward and uncomplicated manner
that the ‘‘gene-talk’’ literature seems to suggest. We argue that there is a lack of relevant studies to support and analyse the
notion of sports performance as an immensely rich and complex practice. We conclude that elite sport may be more complex
and heterogeneous than ‘‘gene-talk’’ has imagined to date.
Introduction
In recent years, discussions about the use of genetic
technologies to enhance performance in sport have
been gathering momentum. Arguments in favour of
performance-enhancing interventions include so-
matic genetic modification, germ-line genetic
modification, and the genetic selection of indivi-
duals for funded sports programmes (Miah, 2004;
Munthe, 2000; Sweeney, 2004; Tamburrini, 2002;
Tamburrini & Ta¨nnsjo¨, 2005). Arguments against
such interventions are based on reasons of safety,
moral purity, and athletic tradition (Friedmann &
Koss, 2001; Loland, 2005; Munthe, 2000). In this
paper, we explore and reflect critically on what elite
sport1 may expect or fear from genetic technologies.
In particular, we explore the language in which we
(where ‘‘‘we’’ denotes scientists, sports scientists,
the media, sports coaches, academics) tend to
speak about genetics, elite sport, and the human
body  we will call this language ‘‘gene-talk’’-which
imagines the world of elite sport as one in which
genes were always dominant in athletic perfor-
mance. Until recently, this genetically organized
world was always beyond the powers of intervention
or correction. But today the situation is changing.
Developments in genetic knowledge will have a
powerful impact on elite sport  or so we are
told (Adam, 2001; Aschwanden, 2000; Azzazy,
Mansour, & Christenson, 2005; Sweeney, 2004).
The dominant question here seems to be whether
what is thought to be possible ought to be, and can
be realized.
In this paper we unpack the question. We ask what
it would take to realize what is thought and ought to
be possible. In other words, we ask whether the
practices needed for genetics to intervene so power-
fully in elite sport exist in the straightforward and
uncomplicated manner that the ‘‘gene-talk’’ litera-
ture (Dick, 1997; Friedmann & Koss, 2001; Huard,
Li, Peng, & Fu, 2003; Montgomery et al ., 1998;
Rankinen et al ., 2001; Steinacker & Wolfarth, 2002;
Wilson, 1998; Wolfarth, 2002; Woodridge, 1998)
seems to suggest. We think that this unpacking
1 The reasons for our focus on elite sport only are two-fold. First, high-profile elite sportspeople enjoy such extensive coverage in the
media that their influence in society generally has become the topic of both popular and academic debate. A second, and related point, is
that much of what goes on in elite sports eventually filters ‘‘down’’ into amateur sports (e.g. drug taking; new techniques such as the double-
handed drive volley in tennis; fashion such as lycra running shorts in athletics) rather than ‘‘up’’ into elite sport.
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reveals new questions about genetics and elite sport.
For instance, what kinds of ‘‘genetization’’ of sports
practices are needed for genetic interventions to be
effective? Is it worth the effort to genetize sports
practices in this way? We also think that the research
needed to fill the lacuna between ‘‘gene-talk’’ and
‘‘sport-talk’’ will provide insights into what the
processes of ‘‘preparatory genetization’’ of sport
look like. The process in which the term ‘‘talent’’
tends to become synonymous with ‘‘genetic make-
up’’ is an example of such a process. We have
borrowed the term ‘‘gene-talk’’ from Evelyn Fox
Keller (2000, p. 10 and pp. 133148). For Fox
Keller, the primacy of genes as an explanation for the
structure and function of biology has gradually
disappeared. The human genome project has not
turned out to be the end of a century-long search,
but rather the start of an infinitely complex new era
in which the major issue is to find out how genes
relate to the richness and complexities of biological
life. Notwithstanding the modesty with which genet-
ics sometimes presents itself these days, however, the
language of genetic causality and primacy  ‘‘gene-
talk’’  is still very alive, and shapes our (vision of
the) world. ‘‘Words enable us’’, Fox Keller writes
(2000, p. 138). She calls for the development of a
subtle and well-informed study and language of
broad ‘‘biological’’ practices in which the richness
and complexity of genes in our biology can be
understood. Our paper can be read as an attempt
to initiate that language and study for the sphere of
elite sport and human movement.
First, we will sketch out, albeit somewhat a
caricature, the world that is assumed in ‘‘gene-
talk’’. Then we will elaborate on the idea that
performance in elite sport is much more complex
than can be grasped in the logic of genetics. We
argue that there is a lack of relevant studies to
support and analyse the notion of sports perfor-
mance as an immensely rich and complex practice.
We conclude that elite sport may be more complex
and heterogeneous than ‘‘gene-talk’’ has imagined to
date.
‘‘Gene-talk’’
‘‘Gene-talk’’ entails a triple logic. Its first element is
genetic reductionism, albeit a moderate one. It
assumes that athletic performance is primarily and
largely due to the athlete’s personal genetic make-up.
While it does not deny that performance consists of
other elements too, such as training, coaching,
funding, facilities, the environment, and so on,
‘‘gene-talk’’’ suggests that these other elements are
essentially different  environmental rather than
natural  from genes. Genes are taken to be natural
and given, and it is therefore a matter of either
having or not having the proper ones for perfor-
mance. One cannot ‘‘learn’’ genes in the way that
one can learn to embody skills, nor can one ‘‘put on’’
genes in the way that one can put on specific clothes.
Thus, in ‘‘gene-talk’’ genes come first and are
fundamental to who we are and what we are capable
of. To put it more radically: it is impossible to
compensate for a lack of proper genes, but a lack of
proper social, material, and environmental technol-
ogies can be compensated for in a performance.
To some extent, genes are now what used to be
called ‘‘talent’’. The two terms have become synon-
ymous. But talent is different: it is to do with the
surprising ability of athletes to come back from a
losing position, or with finishing the marathon on a
‘‘bad’’ day. Talent is not only to be found in the
body’s make-up; it is also the ability to use the wind
or the sun, or a ‘‘bad’’ bounce, to one’s advantage.
Talent is not always fixed and determined: it also
develops in relevant circumstances. Talent is synon-
ymous with ‘‘being gifted’’ rather than merely with
genetic make-up. Indeed, we still hear athletes and
others call out in surprise and admiration that ‘‘this
girl is so talented!’’, where talent connotes not
unambiguously with ‘‘this girl has such good genes!’’
Talent can even be related to skills that do not seem
to have a genetic marker: motivation, passion, the
will to win, the ability to lose, and so on. In present
practices these skills are indispensable, but they are
not obviously or only genetic. That the two terms 
‘‘genetic make-up’’ and ‘‘talent’’  are often taken to
be synonymous is an indication that the rich and
heterogeneous notions and practices of talent are
being genetized. This powerful image of what con-
stitutes performance  first come the irreplaceable
genes, then replaceable technologies  makes the
application of genetic technologies for enhancing the
human body relatively easy, rhetorically speaking:
these words enable us (Fox Keller, 2000, p. 138).
For it is only a small step from an image of genes as
essential and foundational to performance, to the
vision that their manipulation will hugely enhance
performance. Whether such interventions fit the
practices of elite sport rather than the laboratory
practices in which they are invented is not often an
issue, or so it seems. Intervening in the process of
talent selection, before or after birth, or in the DNA
of an ambitious child who lacks just a little some-
thing, perhaps speed or stamina? ‘‘We can do it
(so goes the mantra), if not now then certainly
within a year or five’’ (for ‘‘gene-talk’’ is often
‘‘future-talk’’) (Azzazy et al ., 2005; Huard et al .,
2003; Montgomery et al ., 1998; Rankinen et al .,
2001; Steinacker & Wolfarth, 2002; Wolfarth, 2002).
And, of course, we need to discuss the consequences
and the ‘‘oughts’’ of such interventions. But we tend
to forget to articulate that interventions are only
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possible  if at all  when they are preceded by great
changes in the preparation, training, monitoring,
and evaluation of pre-race or pre-match athletes.
Preparing for potential genetic interventions ‘‘trans-
lates’’ practices towards a readiness to be affected by
such interventions, and such translations may be
both discursive and material. ‘‘Gene-talk’’ partakes
in this preparatory process: it ‘‘enables us’’, and at
the same time it tends to look away from the
enabling effects of what it proposes. Genetic inter-
ventions need a prepared world, and it is far from
evident to us that that world exists throughout  and
that we want to make it so2.
The second element of ‘‘gene-talk’’ reinforces the
first. It assumes that contemporary elite sport is little
more than a genetic lottery. On this account, the
manipulation of genetic material for the sake of
athletic performance is merely the last step (perhaps)
in a centuries long process of the quantification,
standardization, and technologization of environ-
ments, rules, measurements, materials, and . . . hu-
human bodies. The process shows that scientific
knowledge and technologies of all kinds and in all
places gradually eliminate whatever is unruly  and
therefore human  in high-performance sport to
create the greatest possible equality for and in
athletes to perform. On this view, genetic modifica-
tions and interventions (e.g. somatic, germ-line)
(Munthe, 2000; Pe´russe et al ., 2003; Tamburrini,
2002; Tamburrini & Ta¨nnsjo¨, 2005) are simply at the
most recent end of the measuring, standardizing,
and controlling continuum that began, arguably,
with the stop watch in the eighteenth century
(Eichberg, 1982) and moved through to the use of
performance-enhancing drugs in the twentieth cen-
tury, incorporating many other measuring, standar-
dizing, and controlling technological innovations
along the way. Within this mode, it is a peculiar
anachronism, at least at first glance, that almost all
elements of elite sports practice are quantified,
controlled, and thus predictable, except human
genes. And so we are now at the fascinating point
at which the last relevant inequality between athletes
is their genetic make-up  and we are about to be
able to eliminate that ‘‘unfairness’’! (Tamburrini,
2002).
Philosophers like Hoberman (1996) and Rintala
(1995) deplore this state of affairs, arguing that
technology has already gone too far in destroying
whatever is human in elite sport. They do not want
the unfairness of ‘‘the genetic lottery’’ to be resolved
through genetic manipulation that leads to equaliza-
tion, for that would dehumanize elite sport even
more. For them, an option might be to develop, as
Loland (2002) suggests, modalities of sport that
are less directed at higher, stronger, faster, and
less infiltrated by commerce. For posthumanists3
(Butryn, 2002) who argue that humanity is imma-
nently technological (and that the human body is
always already a hybrid of man and machine), the
humanistic idea that technology would be antitheti-
cal to humanity is senseless. Yet they have trouble
explaining themselves when it comes to the question
of whether or not to eliminate the ‘‘unfair’’ genetic
inequality between athletes through a further tech-
nologization of the human body: when and why
would the involvement of bodies with technologies
reach its limits? When would the human element in
the hybrid cease to exist? For posthumanists, the
only option is to hail the ongoing cyborgification of
the human body: there is no ‘‘human’’ boundary that
cannot be crossed. More importantly, however, is
that both humanists and posthumanists assume that
the ‘‘facts’’ are ‘‘true’’: that elite sport is about to
become merely a genetic lottery in which genes
themselves are the only unruly and unmodified
elements left.
This second element of ‘‘gene-talk’’ also carries a
powerful rhetoric because here, too, the assumption
that sport is (almost) a genetic lottery makes the
justification of the application of genetic knowledge
and technology less problematic. We think, again,
that understanding sports practices in terms of a
genetic lottery makes the ‘‘application’’ of genetic
knowledge and technologies too much of an ‘‘ought’’
question alone: now that elite sport has definitely
turned into a genetic lottery, and now that we have
or are about to have the knowledge/technology to
eliminate relevant genetic inequalities between ath-
letes, ought we or ought we not proceed? Would that
be ethically responsible? And again, we suggest that
the ‘‘facts’’ assumed by these imperatives are ambig-
uous and hard to find. Thinking of elite sport in
terms of a genetic lottery points to yet another
genetization of the language of sport. And although
there is a lack of studies that actively ‘‘translate’’
actual sports practices into ‘‘data’’ on this issue, we
conjecture that even the most extremely standar-
dized and quantified sport (the 100-m run is an
archetypical example which we address at the end of
this paper) involves much more than merely the
genetic make-up of the runners.
Most debates on how or whether to proceed with
genetics in sport tend to follow from this logic. The
2 For the classical notion that laboratory knowledge is not applicable just like that in the ‘‘outside world’’, but needs to be translated and
matched, see Latour and Woolgar (1987) and Latour (1988).
3 The view that we are ‘‘post’’ or ‘‘trans’’ human if we have transgressed the boundaries between animals, humans, and machines with,
for example, an electronic pacemaker, an artificial limb or an implanted corneal lense.
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‘‘facts’’ from the genetic laboratories feed into the
ethical debates on genetics and elite sport through a
linear extrapolation of these facts to the world of elite
sport. The assumption is that what works in the
laboratory will also work outside it. And so debates
focus on what would, could, might or ought to be the
physical, legal, economic, ethical, humanistic, poli-
tical, health, and social implications of the deliberate
modification of genes with(in) the body. And
whether we want such interventions, or forbid
them, and if so, how? And if we would allow them,
would sport still be interesting and economically
viable? Would genetically enhanced athletes be
entertaining? Would they be good role models for
our children? Wouldn’t health risks be involved? Do
we want to live in a world like that? Is it still possible
to alter developments? And who is in charge? Do
athletes have a say in all that happens to their bodies?
These are no doubt important questions. But they
pass over an equally important point: the normative
questions assume that the language of sport is the
language of genes, and that elite sport as it is
currently played out, matches genetics to such an
extent that the question is not whether interventions
are feasible, but whether they ought to be under-
taken. We think that these assumptions have, as yet,
too weak an empirical basis, and in fact we doubt
that at this point an empirical basis is easy to find.
Thus far, we lack the scientific research that illus-
trates and theorizes how the practices of elite sports
develop, so that we can see whether, how, and where
these practices are, or are becoming, unambiguously
genetic so that a transition to deliberate genetic
manufacturing is indeed a possibility. In many cases,
we think the assumption that we can actually do
what we think we ought to, is rarely based on
appropriate knowledge of how and the extent to
which ‘‘genes’’ do actually function in elite sports
practices.
This brings us to the third element of ‘‘gene-talk’’.
‘‘Gene-talk’’ suggests that what is possible in genetic
laboratories is easily applicable in the outside world
because the world is already, and has always been,
genetically organized. This particular view of the
world as already genetic is far from being theoreti-
cally neutral. It renders invisible the idea that genetic
interventions need tranformations to work. For
‘‘gene-talk’’, the world (of elite sport) has always
been genetic whether it is conceptualized as such or
not. We now come to understand this order and are
able to manufacture it as we think proper. That
language, we think, with Fox Keller (2000), actively
presents to us a particular version of the world. It
suggests factuality but with that it simultaneously
shows, hides, and brings with it normative interven-
tions in how we think about things and what we
think is possible or impossible. As policy makers,
philosophers, geneticists, athletes, and so on, we
need to become alert to the translations of sport
language into genetic language  from blood, sweat,
and tears to haematological fluid, apocrine secre-
tions, and skin exudations.
A good example of this is the issue of patient
compliance to medication for diabetes: for diabetes
medication to work in a patient’s body, the patient
needs to reorganize her life; she needs a diet; she
needs to measure her blood sugar levels at particular
intervals; and she needs to lead a ‘‘regular’’ life. Only
if she makes her body resemble the laboratory-body
will the medication work (Mol, 2002; Pasveer &
Heesterbeek, 2001; Willems, 1995). Her body must
be made into a ‘‘working object’’ for the medication
(Daston & Galison, 1992). We do not know whether
or how the many practices and modalities of elite
sport are doing this work of bevoming ‘‘compliant’’
to genetic technologies and knowledge. We lack
studies that show us the modalities of elite sports
and the knowledge of whether and how they
genetize.
Others (Benschop, Horstman, & Vos, 2003; de
Vries, Horstman, & Haveman, 1997; Huijer &
Horstman, 2004) have examined such changes
brought about in everyday life in their studies on
genetics and preventive medicine. As soon as genetic
technologies touch upon people’s lives, it is imme-
diately obvious that these lives were not previously
lived ‘‘genetically’’. Genetic propositions profoundly
change a person’s past, present, and future liaisons,
and even when people decide not to go along and
have a genetic ‘‘check-up’’, they now explicitly em-
body genes and genetic aberrations. In other words,
whether it concerns preventive, selective, therapeutic
or enhancement technologies, they all need a (social)
body that is primarily genetically organized. As
‘‘gene-talk’’ assumes that bodies function that way,
the work of genetization is effectively rendered
invisible.
Genetics, we argue, is thus not only about the
effects of actual genetic interventions, but also about
the quiet changes of normal life into a genetically
regulated life. Such transformations, we think, are
far from innocent. Yet again, we know very little
about what occurs in sports practices in this respect
(Butryn, 2003; Butryn & Masucci, 2003). But the
‘‘gene-talk’’ proposal that we should think our bodies
are already (and have always been) genetically
organized has proven to be quite powerful to date.
It has rendered invisible the disappointing results of
the genetic project, and hidden how endlessly more
complex it is to determine the work of genes in the
development of athletic abilities, or diseases. We
think it is extremely important to become sensitive to
the preparatory work that must be done for genetic
interventions to function, and to start asking
226 H. Sheridan et al.
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whether we ‘‘ought’’ while that work is being done
and not after it is completed.
‘‘Sport-talk’’
In the remainder of this paper, we argue that ‘‘gene-
talk’’ is as yet unfit fully to grasp what happens in
elite sports practices, and that it is important to
enrich or re-order ‘‘gene-talk’’ with what we will call
‘‘sport-talk’’. For we have reasons to believe that
today’s elite sport does not seamlessly fit the genetic
interventions we fear or hope for. We also think that
‘‘gene-talk’’, in particular because of the way it is
presented as being already genetically programmed,
carries with it the risk of becoming a self-fulfilling
prophecy. We suggest that it is of utmost importance
to start filling in the intellectual wastelands between
‘‘gene-talk’’ and the actual and everyday practices of
elite sport with social-scientifically, ethnographically,
and philosophically inspired studies. We will suggest
what might appear, potentially, on these wastelands.
‘‘Gene-talk’’ is quite general in character: the
importance of genes, or so it seems, is not sport-
specific. However, there are many reasons to believe
that the contribution of ‘‘given’’ qualities in perfor-
mance is sport-specific rather than general. In team
sports, talents are ‘‘done’’ differently than in indivi-
dual sports, endurance sports will differ from ex-
plosive sports, and record-sports may use talents, or
genes, in ways that differ from their employment in
qualitative sports (Loland, 2002). It can even be
imagined that within these modalities, the articula-
tion of talent differs profoundly. Moreover, training
hard requires other elements and talents such as
being able to stand the stress of competition or to
find the motivation to go on after a bad performance.
A final play-off will differ from a giant killing game
and from a grudge match. In other words, the
qualities needed to perform tend to be different,
sport by sport and within each sport.
A brief look at long-track ice speedskating shows
that the (genetically) ideal body is reinvented time
and again. One of the skaters’4 so-called X-shaped
legs gradually changed from an unusual anatomical
anomaly that was to be compensated for (interview
7 July 2003) into a pair of legs that are spectacularly
efficient. Moreover, not one single body image but a
wealth of differences seems to be constitutive for
what the sport contains at this point. The speedska-
ter who is capable of a sudden acceleration halfway
through the 10-km race has a huge advantage over
those who cannot do that. Furthermore, because of a
combination of other complex reasons (e.g. ice,
material, generational accommodation to klaps-
kates5, new knowledge about training and nutrition,
inclusion of the importance of the team in this
individual sport), speedskaters go faster than ever
before. In other words, what is needed to perform
differs from sport to sport, differs in the kind of
performance within the sport, and differs through
time. To claim that it is always genes that ultimately
cause and therefore explain the relevant differences
between athletes or teams limits any conceptual
insight into the complexity of what constitutes
performance, and is unable to account for the
process-centred character of performance. It is, we
think, of utmost importance to study and describe
how elite sport, in all its modalities, acquires
performance-enhancing elements if only to be able
to determine what we are about to manipulate, and
what kind of effects they will have on performance.
‘‘Gene-talk’’ also seems to suggest that it would be
an option to isolate and ‘‘treat’’ genes separate from
all the elements that contribute to a performance. If
performance is merely or mainly a matter of genes,
such interventions would have a marked effect on
performance. Again, we have our doubts. It might be
possible to do this in a laboratory contect and then
speculate about the precise location and quality of
relevant genes to performance. But we think that
precisely when it counts  when performance is
situated in the actual practice of training or competi-
tion  this body does not exist, and the isolation of
its relevant genes is a theoretical and practical
fiction. We think that doing sport (training twice a
day, eating a modified diet, travelling 200 days a
year, the excitement and the passion of competition,
the confrontation with unexpected events or vocif-
erous vocal support for an opponent, unforeseen
climatic changes, and so on) resists any precise and
durable isolation of genetic from other elements.
Performance, we conjecture, is not constituted by
the sum of its parts, but results out of the quality of
the blend of the elements that constitute it . Even if it
would be possible to render explicit all these
elements and categorize them as genetic/natural or
achieved, it would still be hard and senseless to
isolate them, treat them, and then ‘‘hand them back’’
to the body  as if performance would then radically
and visibly improve. Rather, we think it is important
4 Data come from ethnographic fieldwork performed by one of us (Bernike Pasveer) among Dutch professional speedskaters in 2003.
5 With klapskates, the skate disconnects from a skater’s boot. A hinge beneath the ball of the foot between the shoe and the blade allows
the foot to rotate while the blade remains gliding on the ice. This way, the skater stays in contact with the ice longer than with traditional
skates. It allows plantar flexion of the foot at the end of the push-off (van Hilvoorde, Vos and De Wert, in press). It is held that those who
learned to skate on klapskates have embodied the technique in a more natural manner than those who started to skate on them midway
through their career (fieldnotes of Bernike Pasveer).
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to know what these mixtures look like in context,
and to determine whether practices exist or are in the
making in which genes are the most important
constituent of performance. Practices, that is, in
which elite sport has indeed turned into a mere
genetic lottery or is about to do so.
‘‘Gene-talk’’ is effective in that it has succeeded, to
some extent, in suggesting the reality of genetic
practices. Our suggestion is that we do not know
whether ‘‘gene-talk’’ claims are true. Put more
bluntly, we do not think the reality of elite sport is
as genetic, at least not yet, as it is claimed to be but
the point is, of course, that we claim that this is a
problem in itself: we want references about the
‘‘middle-ground’’ but we don’t have that many
middle-ground studies (Montgomery et al ., 1998;
Rankinen et al ., 2001). To reinforce this point, we
take the example of the 100 m sprint and compare it
with a game of tennis. It would seem that the 100-m
athletics race is potentially one of the more geneti-
cally controllable, manageable and therefore achiev-
able sports6. The argument goes that there are only a
few genetic variables that need to be engineered in a
100-m athlete because the 100-m race is one of the
least complex sports to perform. It is an individual
sport; it usually lasts just over 10 s; the only tactic is
to run as fast as possible in a straight line, and it is
usually summed up as being just about speed and
strength. The 100-m race is the standard ‘‘genetic
lottery’’ example. By contrast, a sport like tennis is
more complex because it can be an individual or a
team game (singles, doubles, mixed doubles) and
therefore is more dynamic; a match can last for as
little as about 20 minutes to as much as about
6 hours. There are, then, many more opportunities
for game- or non-game-related actions to happen in
the longer timescale; the nature of the game, its rules
(e.g. scoring system), and ethos (e.g. etiquette)
require the development of a wide range of techni-
ques and tactics; the extent to which techniques and
tactics are used and when they are used can vary
enormously from game to game; and it may be
summed up, albeit not easily, as being a game of
skill, strategy, tactics, explosive speed, power, sta-
mina, handeye coordination, and balance.
Yet it is far from evident that these two scenarios
are as straightforward as they seem. The 100-m race
might be far more complex than what it seems to
be. Perhaps the 100 m is as technically complex as
tennis. There could be just as many technical skills
to acquire to be a good 100-m runner as there are
for playing tennis. It might be that they are simply
less visible than in tennis. Perhaps the 100-m race
lasts much longer than 10 seconds. After all, it is
widely acknowledged by the athletes themselves,
their coaches, and race commentators that what
goes on in the pre-race build-up (on the warm-up
track and on the race track just before the race
itself) could play a large part in determining the
outcome of the race. It is during this time that
athletes can ‘‘psyche out’’ their opponents or dictate
the mood or atmosphere of the race. It might be
that the 100-m race really lasts about 1 hour and
10 seconds. The point is that we do not really know
because we do not yet have enough knowledge
about the role and place of genetics in particular
sporting practices (e.g. training practices, techni-
ques, tactics, the competitive context, and so on).
We think it is important to study these practices and
to observe and take seriously the richness of the
language of sport. It is possible that we need to
conclude that ‘‘talent’’ is not yet synonymous with
‘‘genetic make-up’’, and that terms like ‘‘having
good hands’’ or ‘‘having a good day’’ carry more
weight than merely a symbolic content.
We need, then, to tap into the ‘‘ordinary’’ under-
standings of sport. By this we mean, first and
foremost, the voices of the athletes themselves.
There has been little research done on athletes’
perceptions and experiences of technology, although
Butryn’s (2003) narrative analysis of a group of track
and field athletes is an exception. We need to explore
the extent to which athletes express and describe
their lives in terms of the language of genetics and/or
talent, and the implications of that for athletes,
sport, and society. Elite sport, we think, is still an
irreducibly rich world; a world that ethnographically
inspired studies could develop or design a language
for that potential irreducibility, a language that could
enrich the debates about the dangers and promises
of genetics for elite sport. ‘‘Gene-talk’’ proposes
something similar to us: a vocabulary in which the
work of working towards performance can be
described so that we think of our present lives in
terms of genetically defined opportunities and risks.
The danger here is that ‘‘gene-talk’’ becomes the
only reality we can imagine. And that language, we
think, is a poor interpretation of elite sports. For it is
a one-dimensional or ‘‘thin’’ interpretation of sport
performance as merely a scientific enterprise. Sport
performance is much more than this, it is about
passions and the emotions: guts, fight, heart, and
spirit. And thus it demands a much ‘‘thicker’’
6 Meier (1985), for example, suggests there are some sports  in particular the 100 m  where athletes are able to neutralize or negate
deliberately, distracting or restrictive human characteristics or qualities. Loland (2001, p. 130) claims that since ‘‘record sports’’ are highly
specialized  in particular the 100 m  they are the kinds of sports where ‘‘the potential for improvement is reduced to one or a few basic
human qualities’’.
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vocabulary to fully describe and account for its
complex and heterogeneous nature.
The middle
And so it seems that debates on genes in sport are of
extremes, of advantages, and disadvantages that are
all based on projections of the genetic essence of elite
sport. The question that arises is, given the fact that
elite sport is a matter of genes anyway, ought we or
ought we not grab the chance and manipulate these
genes for better performance and for more effective
trajectories of our genetically predisposed children.
We propose to shift the debate to another ground
somewhere in between these extremes to a radical
middle position, the almost empty terrain in between
genetics and elite sports practices. It could be that
the terrain is populated already with studies on
genetics and preventive care, but when it comes to
sport and performance, it is quite empty. Ironically,
then, this middle ground would be the most radical
place to be. Not because it is empty, but because it
consists, potentially, of more than genes and be-
cause, potentially, it will afford a language that can
enrich ‘‘gene-talk’’, or can at least compete with it.
Instead of downplaying passion, joy, the complex-
ities of training, having ‘‘good legs’’ or a ‘‘bad day’’,
and the richness of relations that constitute perfor-
mance, ‘‘sport-talk’’ would theorize these elements
to determine where they, too, figure in the constitu-
tion of somebody’s situated competencies. This
language might do justice to elite sport in ways
that ‘‘gene-talk’’ cannot. Moreover, it may counter
the genetic colonization of our language and the
things that connect to it.
Conclusion
We end this paper, then, with an unexpected
‘‘ought’’. We ought to use and produce knowledge
of how performances are done in the heterogeneous
world of elite sport; of where and how genes matter;
and of which mixtures of elements matter when it
comes to explaining the extreme performances of
athletes’ bodies. We do not think we have to invent
this language from scratch. For many people are
experts about elite sport. What is lacking, however,
is a social-scientific translation of all the expertise of
athletes and their co-workers. We need anthropolo-
gists of sport, who would describe what occurs in
practice and who would analyse the ways in which
the complexities of everyday life are constitutive of
performance. We need philosophers of sport to
develop an understanding and appreciation of
the underpinning philosophical and epistemo-
logical issues. And we need appreciations of the
languages  words, body-talk  in which elite sports’
experts communicate what moves them, quite lit-
erally, because language increases our vision and is
enabling.
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